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  Abstract
In this paper we investigate the determinants of municipal labour demand
in Sweden 1988-1995. Utilising a major grant reform in 1993, through
which a switch from mainly targeted to mainly general central
government grants occurred, we are able to identify which type of grants
that have the largest effects on municipal employment. We find a larger
municipal employment elasticity with respect to grants before the reform,
implying that the more freedom given to the municipalities, the less they
seem inclined to spend on municipal employment. We further find (i) a
short run wage elasticity of approximately -0.5 and a long run ditto of
approximately -0.9, (ii) a quite sluggish adjustment process: only 60% of
the desired change in municipal employment is implemented in the first
year, (iii) that the demographic structure is an important determinant of
municipal employment, and (iv) that the behavioural pattern is different
in “socialist” municipalities.
Keywords: Municipal labour demand, Panel data, Median voter model,
Sluggishness.
JEL-classification: H70, J45, C233
1.  Introduction
Despite the fact that most local governments in the western world are
large employers, there are very few studies investigating the determinants
of local government labour demand. This pattern is especially
pronounced in Sweden, where the total local government sector
1 accounts
for about 30% of total employment in the economy. The corresponding
figure for the municipalities is about 20%, and wages and payroll taxes
constitute approximately 50% of municipal expenditures. This makes the
local governments in Sweden the largest single employer in the economy,
but still no studies exist examining the factors governing Swedish local
government labour demand.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of municipal
labour demand in Sweden during 1988 - 1995, a period in which the
public sector faced new challenges in terms of diminishing tax bases and
shifts in the demographic structure to more young and more retired
people. More specifically, we will in this paper (i) Estimate wage
elasticities; (ii) Evaluate the effects of switching from specific
intergovernmental grants to more general ones, where the municipalities
may use grants at their disposal more freely. These effects are possible to
identify since a major change in the grant system was made in 1993. The
outcome of such an institutional change might well be policy relevant for
other countries than Sweden; (iii) Study how demographic and political
factors affect municipal labour demand; (iv) Examine whether the
adjustment process in Swedish municipalities is sluggish or not. Evidence
in  Dahlberg & Johansson (1996, 1997) indicates that it might be
important to control for dynamics when investigating the behaviour of
                                                       
1 The total local government sector in Sweden is made up of the municipalities
and the counties. In this paper we will focus our interest on the municipalities,
which are responsible for, e.g., schooling, day care, and elderly care.4
Swedish local governments. Furthermore, Holtz-Eakin & Rosen (1991)
find that dynamics is important in their study on rationality in municipal
labour demand in the US.
The few existing studies investigating local government labour demand
either estimate demand systems where the total amount of employment is
treated as fixed (see, e.g, Ehrenberg (1973)) or evaluate public service
employment programs using aggregate time series data (see, e.g, Johnson
& Tomola (1977)). For an overview of earlier studies, see Ehrenberg &
Schwarz (1986).  Holtz-Eakin & Rosen (1991) do not study the
determinants of municipal labour demand per se, but rather test
rationality, in the sense of Hall (1978), and assume that the local
government decision maker maximises an intertemporal utility function.
In this paper, we adopt a median voter model where the voters optimise
subject to both their individual and their municipality’s budget
constraints, thereby making the level of municipal employment
endogenously determined. Under specific assumptions on the utility
function of the median voter and the production function of the
municipality, we come up with a closed form solution for a municipal
labour demand function which we estimate using panel data methods.
The paper is organised as follows: the theoretical model is set up and
described in the next section. Section 3 gives some institutional
descriptions on Swedish municipalities together with some
characterisations of the data we use. Section 4 presents our empirical
findings, whereas the final section summarises and concludes.
2.  Theoretical Model
When studying the behaviour of local governments, individual
preferences must somehow be translated into a single choice at the
municipality level. Since the days of Kenneth Arrow’s formulation of the
famous Impossibility Theorem, public finance economists have been
aware of the fact that aggregating preferences is a tricky business.
However, under certain assumptions (e.g. single-peaked preferences, a5
single majority voting system and a one-dimensional policy question (a
single public service)) these problems can be overcome. It will turn out
that, if these assumptions hold, the winning proposal in a majority vote
will be the proposal made by the voter with the median position in
preferences. This was first stated by Hotelling (1929) and later developed
by Bowen (1943) and Black (1958). Even though it can be questioned
whether the assumptions underlying the median voter model actually
hold, it has become the most common behavioural specification used
when modelling the decision making process at the local government
level, and we will in this paper follow this tradition and use the median
voter model.
Let us investigate the median voter’s optimisation problem in
municipality i M =1,...,  in time period t T =1,..., . The preferences of
the median voter are assumed to be captured by the function
( ) U U X e it it it = , (1)
where  () U ￿  is a quasi-concave utility function,  Xit  a composite private
good (with a price normalised to one), and e E N it it it =  per capita local
public provision of a private good. The median voter maximises the
utility function subject to two budget constraints; his or her individual
budget constraint as well as the municipality’s budget constraint. First,
the level of private consumption cannot exceed the median voter’s
disposable income
( ) X t y it it it
m = - 1 (2)6
where tit  is the local tax rate and  yit
m  the median voter’s (before tax)
income. Furthermore, maximisation is constrained by the municipality’s
budget constraint
t N y G w N it it it it it it
d + = (3)
where  Nit  is the number of inhabitants in municipality i in period t,  yit
the mean individual (before tax) income,  Git  intergovernmental grants
received by the municipality,  wit the  wage rate received by individuals
employed by the municipality, and 
d
it n  municipal employment needed in
order to supply  eit.
2 Solving (3) for the local tax rate, and substituting
into (2) yields
( ) X y g w n it it
m
it it it it
d = + - t (4)
where  git  is intergovernmental grants per capita and  tit
it
m
it
y
y
=  is the
tax price paid by each median voter.
3 The tax-price is to be interpreted as
the marginal cost, in terms of increased tax payments, facing the
                                                       
2 Here we abstract from capital inputs and simply assume that the only input
needed in the supply of E is labour, that is, we assume that the production
function takes the form  ( )
d
it it n f e =  in per capita terms. This assumption is
perhaps not too unrealistic having the types of services municipalities supply in
mind.
3 There is a literature which claims that people employed by the municipality to a
larger extent vote for higher municipal expenditures than people not employed
by the municipality (see, e.g., Courant, Gramlich, & Rubinfeld (1979)). In relation
to this it might be noted that we assume that the median voter is not employed by
the municipality, an assumption which probably is fulfilled.7
individuals for an additional unit of the publicly provided good.
Substituting (4) and the production function  ( ) e f n it it
d =  into (1) yields
the following maximisation problem
( ) ( ) [ ] max ,
n
it
m
it it it it
d
it
d
d U U y g w n f n   = + - t (5)
In order to fix ideas for the empirical part of the paper and to get a labour
demand function that can be easily implemented in an econometric model,
we assume that the production function takes the simple form e an it it
d =
and that the utility function takes the form
( ) ( )
max
n
it
m
it it it
d
it it
it
d
it
d d
y w n g s
b an b an
 U = - +
- - +
+
￿
Ł
￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ - -
￿
Ł
￿
￿
ł
￿ exp 1
b t b
(6)
where  b a =
a
b
,  s
z
it
it = +
b
a
b
2 , and  z z z z = + + + + d d d d 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 ...
is a vector of socio-economic characteristics. This form of the utility
function has been used and discussed by, for example, Hausman (1980)
and Blomquist (1983).
Solving the maximisation problem in (6) yields the following municipal
labour demand function
( ) n z y g w it
d
it it
m
it it it it
* = + + + b t a t      (7)
which will form the basis for our empirical investigation of the static
model in Section 4.8
However, since it is not likely that municipalities may adjust labour
freely, we would expect actual employment to deviate from the one
optimal in a static framework. Earlier studies in the literature on local
public expenditures indicate some kind of dynamic behaviour of local
governments (see, e.g.,  Holtz-Eakin & Rosen (1991) on U.S. data,
Dahlberg & Johansson (1996, 1997) on Swedish data, and  Borge &
Rattsø (1993, 1996) and Borge,  Rattsø &  Sørensen (1996) on
Norwegian data). We will therefore introduce dynamics by combining the
static median voter model with a partial adjustment rule. The dynamic
formulation separates the desired amount of employment ( ) nit
d*  from
actual employment ( ) nit
d  for each year. The desired level of employment
is determined by equation (7), whereas the relationship between the
desired and the actual level of employment is formulated as a partial
adjustment process. The actual change between periods  t  and t -1 is a
fraction, l, of the desired change
( ) n n n n it
d
it
d
it
d
it
d - = - - - 1 1 l
* (8)
The adjustment coefficient l hence measures the sluggishness of local
government responses to changing desired demand: the smaller the value
of l, the stronger the sluggishness.
Substituting (7) into (8) yields
( ) [ ] ( ) n z y g w n it
d
it it
m
it it it it it
d = + + + + - - l b t a t l     1 1.  (9)
Finally, if we define  m l d j j =   ,  j =0, 1, 2, ...  ,  f l b =   , and
j la = , we can rewrite (9) as9
( ) ( ) n z y g w n it
d
it it
m
it it it it it
d = + + + + - - f t j t l     1 1,  (10)
where  z z z z = + + + + m m m m 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 .... Equation (10) will form the
basis for our empirical analysis of the dynamic model in section 4. We
will also need expressions for different elasticities in order to readily
assess the magnitude of different effects. The short run effects can be
shown to be
4
Income elasticity
5: h f
y
it
m
it
d it
m
y
n
=
Wage elasticity: h jt w
it
it
d it it
w
n
= .
Grant elasticity: h ft g
it
it
d it it
g
n
=     .
When confronting the model with data, we will follow earlier studies and
characterise the median voter as the voter with median income (see
Theorem 2 in Bergstrom & Goodman (1973)).
In the public finance literature, there is a discussion about an anomaly
named the “flypaper effect”, referring to the tendency for money to get
stuck where it hit. According to economic theory, it should make no
                                                        
4 The long run elasticities are obtained by dividing the short run elasticities with
l. The expressions for the elasticities in the static model are the same, however
substituting b  for f  and a   for j.
5 Derivation of (10) with respect to yit
m and taking the effect on t   into account
yields a more complicated expression than above. These elasticities are not
reported in the paper but are available upon request. The income elasticity
reported is the one standard in the literature.10
difference whether money is collected through taxes or through general
grants; an increase in one of them should yield the same increase in
public consumption as an increase in the other. However, studies
investigating the demand for local public services by means of the median
voter model have found that an increase in general grants has
significantly different effects on spending than an increase in (median)
income, which is taken as an indication of such a flypaper effect.
However, given that the intergovernmental grants are targeted rather than
general, it is no longer obvious, even theoretically, that they will have the
same effect on public consumption as income. We will in the empirical
part investigate whether grants and income have the same effect on
labour demand. 
6
In the same line as above, one could argue that the form in which
intergovernmental grants come probably matters for their effects on
public spending. In 1993 there was a major reform that changed the
system of intergovernmental grants from mainly specific to mainly
general ones. This gives us an opportunity to investigate whether specific
grants have had a different effect on local public employment than
general ones.
3.  Data and some Stylised Facts
The data set is obtained from Statistics Sweden
7 and covers 245 Swedish
municipalities during the period 1988 - 1995. In 1995 there were 288
municipalities in Sweden, out of which 284 existed in 1988. 36 of these
were deleted from our data set, because of missing values for some of the
                                                        
6 For a recent overview of the flypaper literature and a discussion of possible
explanations for the flypaper effect, see Bailey & Connolly (1998).
7 More specifically, the sources are ”Yearbook for the Swedish Municipalities”,
”Financial Statements for Swedish Municipalities” and “LINDA”, a large
Longitudinal  INdividual  DAtabase at the Department of Economics, Uppsala
university. For a more detailed description of our data set, see Appendix A.11
variables of interest. Finally, three municipalities ( Gotland, Malmö and
Göteborg) were excluded because they handle activities normally handled
by the county councils. Altogether, this leaves us with a balanced panel
of 245 municipalities over 8 years. The dependent variable in our
theoretically derived model is the number of employed
8 in municipalities,
and the key regressors are INCOME, which is equal to real median
income plus real intergovernmental grants from the central government
times the tax price (median income over mean income), and PRICE,
which is defined as average real wage in the local public sector times the
tax price. These variables enter in per capita figures, in accordance with
the theoretical model.
Table 1.
Time varying means and standard deviations of the key variables.
YEAR MUNICPAL  EMPL. INCOME PRICE
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1988 0.056 0.0065 128583 12809 112174. 6255
1989 0.056 0.0064 135297 13675 116967 6064
1990 0.060 0.0066 135167 14229 114349 6851
1991 0.059 0.0066 123838 11984 108963 7637
1992 0.066 0.0081 124795 10401 114998 7138
1993 0.064 0.0083 122694 10408. 107459 7046
1994 0.065 0.0089 121587 10510. 107448 7648
1995 0.066 0.0094 122859 10130 111186 7208
Total 0.061 0.0086 126852 12945 111693 7750
Notes: Municipal employment is expressed as number of employees per inhabitant in each
municipality. The income and price variables are expressed in 1988 SEK.
Table 1 displays the time varying means and standard deviations of the
key variables. Looking briefly at these, they all seem coherent with a few
                                                        
8 Employed in terms of full time equivalents.12
stylised facts on municipal employment in Sweden. Whereas incomes
have dropped slightly, and prices have by and large remained unaltered,
municipal employment as expressed in the number of employees per
capita, has increased over the period. The main cause for this increase is
the reform in 1992 when municipalities overtook the responsibility for
care for the elderly (ÄDEL-reformen).
In order to examine our key variables under the studied period a bit more
closely, we have estimated the covariances and correlations of first
differences of the logs of these variables. The results can be found in
Appendix B. The purpose of using first differences rather than levels is to
eliminate fixed effects, which we assume to be present in the data.
Looking at the covariances for employment in Table B1, we can see that
the between-variance increases drastically between the years 1991 and
1992, but then returns to its former level almost immediately. This period
coincides with the care-for-the-elderly reform. Comparing the results in
Table B1 to those in Table 1, where we have not accounted for fixed
effects when computing the standard deviations, it appears that the
effects of the reforms appear more idiosyncratic when heterogeneity is
taken into consideration.
Looking at the important policy variable real grants in Table B4, there is
a drastic increase in the between municipalities variance during the
second half of the period, a period which coincides with the switch from
targeted to more general grants from the central government to the
municipalities, as shown in Figure 1.13
Figure 1. General and targeted grants received by the municipalities as a
share of total municipal revenues
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Source: ”Financial Accounts for the Municipalities” (Kommunernas Finanser)
There are two main implications for the empirical part from having
looked at these descriptive statistics. First, we need to take heterogeneity
into consideration, and, secondly, we must somehow capture the
idiosyncratic effects from the care-for-the-elderly reform. The former
consideration is taken into account by adopting a fixed effect approach in
our regressions. Thinking about the latter, it seems plausible that the age
structure of each municipality would be an important explanatory factor
if we want to control for how the reform has affected the municipalities’
demand for labour. If there were a large fraction of elderly, we would
expect the effects of reform to be relatively pronounced. Apart from
including time-dummies to take care of common shocks, we will hence14
also throughout include variables capturing the age structure in order to
control for potentially idiosyncratic effects from reform.
In addition to the median voter’s income, it is possible that his/her
political preferences also influence the desired level of public
consumption. We will therefore use a dummy variable, ( SOC) indicating
if the municipality is lead by a socialist or a conservative local
government, as a proxy for the median voter’s political preferences.
 9 Our
hypothesis is that “Socialists” demand more public consumption, and
thus demand more labour, than do “conservatives”. 
10 Another reason for
employment to differ between socialist and conservative municipalities,
might be that “socialists” probably are more restrictive than
conservatives when it comes to privatising public services handled by
municipalities.
                                                        
9 Furthermore, in the analysis of the dynamic model we will also estimate on sub-
samples, as for example ”socialist municipalities” and ”conservative
municipalities”, to allow them to be heterogeneous in the slope coefficients as
well as in the intercept. See section 4 for a more detailed discussion.
10 Some people have argued that by including SOC as a regressor in a median
voter model, two different theoretical models are mixed and that this implies that
the median voter model is not valid. We have problems in understanding this
argument since we consider SOC as a proxy for the median voter's ideological
preferences. However, one way to test if the inclusion of SOC as a regressor is
"important" (in the sense that the qualitative results are altered) or not, is to
reestimate without SOC as a regressor. It turns out that almost nothing happens
if we disregard from SOC in the estimation. The point estimates, the t-ratios as
well as the elasticities change very little. The qualitative conclusions are
unaffected. All estimations reported in the paper have had SOC as a regressor.
The estimates with SOC excluded are available on request.15
4.  Empirical Results
4.1 Static model
Starting with the static model, we extend equation (7) and estimate
the following fixed effect model
( ) n z y g w f it
d
t it it
m
it it it it i it = + + + + + + i b t a t e     , (11)
where
zit =d 0 +d 1 * YOUNGit +d 2 *YOUNGit-1 +d 3 * OLD_91it +
d 4 * OLD92_it+d 5 * SOCit
fi is a municipality specific fixed effect,  i t  is a time dummy and eit  is a
white noise error term.
11 To remove the fixed effect, we have two
different alternatives: either taking first differences, and use an
instrumental variables approach, described below in more detail, or else,
removing the fixed effect by transforming all variables to deviations from
their means and estimating by OLS; the so called within-estimator. The
latter approach would require strict  exogeneity, an assumption that is
testable by means of a Hausman-test. Performing such a test with the
first difference instrumental variables estimator as the alternative, clearly
                                                        
11 For an explanation of the socio-economic variables, see Appendix A. The
inclusion of the lagged value for YOUNG might seem somewhat odd, but is
mainly motivated by our empirical finding that the lag turned out to be significant
in more cases than the contemporaneous observation. See also the discussion on
the specification test of the dynamic model. Since we wished to keep the z -
regressors constant over different specifications, we have choosen to include the
lag even initially. The main reason for the lag being significant is probably the
“baby-boom” which took place during the period we are investigating. Since
most children spend their first year at home with their parents, the baby boom
will cause the share of young people to increase before the demand for labour in
municipal day-care does.16
rejects the null of strict exogeneity. (The test statistic, which is chi-
squared under a true null, takes on a value of 242.52 with 12 degrees of
freedom.)
 12 Since we conclude that the within-estimator is not possible to
use in this context, we will rely on the first difference  GMM estimation
technique suggested by  Holtz-Eakin,  Newey & Rosen (1988) and
Arellano & Bond (1991).
13 Taking first differences will induce a first-
order MA-process into the transformed residuals, and since we have
potentially endogenous variables on the right hand side, we must rely on
instrumental variable techniques to get consistent estimates. As
instruments we may use values of the dependent variable lagged two
periods back and more, which implies that the number of instruments
grows with t. These instruments will be valid as long as there is no serial
correlation of higher order than one. Since we have an  overidentified
model in the sense that we have more instruments than parameters to
estimate, the validity of the instruments can be tested by means of the
Sargan-test for  overidentifying restrictions and the tests for
autoregressive structures in the residuals presented by  Arellano & Bond
(1991). The estimations are performed in two steps, where, in order to
control for heteroscedasticity, residuals from the first step (GMM1) are
used in the weighting matrix in the second step (GMM2).
14 The first
difference estimates are presented in Table 2. Looking at the specification
and trying to choose proper instruments by means of the  Sargan and
AR(1)-AR(4) tests, there is no indication of misspecification when
                                                        
12The first-difference instrumental variables estimates are given in Table 2. The
(inconsistent) within-estimates are available upon request. We have also
conducted Hausman tests for the validity of a random effects model, and rejected
that specification with both the within specification as well as the first difference
one as alternatives.
13 The only difference between the estimators proposed in these two papers is the
weighting matrix used in the first step. We will use the weighting matrix proposed
by Arellano & Bond (1991).
14 For explicit formulas for the GMM estimator and the test-statistics, see, e.g.,
Arellano & Bond (1991).17
"OLD" and "PRICE" are treated as endogenous. Treating "OLD" and/or
"PRICE" as exogenous, however yields quite bad specification results.
Conducting difference Sargan-tests on "OLD" and "PRICE" along the
lines of Arellano & Bond (1991), testing the null hypothesis that they are
exogenous, the null is rejected. Since the model specification in GMM1 is
rejected by means of the  Sargan statistic for most specifications
presented below, we have an indication that heteroscedasticity might be
prevalent. Using these results as guidelines for the choice of instruments,
we get the estimates included in Table 2 for the static model.18
Table 2. Static employment model (eq. 11).
GMM1 GMM2
Variable Coeff SE t-ratio Coeff SE t-ratio
INCOME 0.2517 0.0533     4.7185 0.2374 0.0277   8.5610
PRICE -0.6122 0.0956    -6.4042 -0.4811 0.0578  -8.3196
YOUNG -0.2353 0.1879    -1.2521 -0.3030 0.1346 -0.2251
YOUNG(-1) 0.3434   0.1846     1.8600 0.1860  0.1317   1.4122
OLD _91 -0.1071    1.3102  -0.0817 -0.1885  0.7461 -0.2526
OLD 92_ 2.4468    1.3594     1.8000 1.9479  0.7283   2.6747
SOC 0.3922   0.6604    0.5939 0.5517  0.4453   1.2390
Sargan(1) Sargan(2) AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) AR(4)
Test -3.9786 -0.8781 -1.2312 -0.4090
p-value 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.190 0.109 0.341
Notes
i) GMM estimates obtained using DPD for Ox 1.20. For a description of the programs, see
Doornik (1996) and Arellano et al. (1997)
ii) Standard errors are computed using the asymptotic standard errors, which are obtained using
a heteroscedasticity-robust estimator of the variance-covariance matrix.
iii) The AR(1) - AR(4) tests are reported as the test statistics for first- through fourth order serial
correlation in the residuals in first differences in the GMM2 estimation. These statistics are each
supposed to be asymptotically standard normal under the null of no serial correlation.
iv) A constant and time dummies are included in all regressions.
v) Sargan(1) (Sargan(2)) gives the p-value of the Sargan test of the over-identifying restrictions
(validity of instruments) in the GMM1 (GMM2) estimation. Under the null of valid instruments, the
Sargan statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with (p-k) degrees of freedom, where
p is the number of moment conditions and k is the number of coefficients estimated.
vi) The set of instruments includes INCOME, YOUNG, YOUNG(-1) and SOC in first differences,
EMPLOYMENT, PRICE and OLD in levels all available observations with lagged 2 years and
more, as well as the constant and the time dummies.
vii) To improve readability, the estimates for INCOME and PRICE have been multiplied by a
factor of 106 whereas the estimates for YOUNG, OLD and SOC have been rescaled by a factor
of 103 for the same reason.19
We can first note that both the price and the income variables enter
significantly and with their expected signs. Investigating the sizes of the
different effects by calculating elasticities, we find that the wage
elasticity equals -0.947 with an estimated standard error of 0.113,
implying that this elasticity is not significantly different from minus one.
The income elasticity is 0.518 (Std. Err 0.06) whereas the grant elasticity
is small, yet significant (0.02, Std.err 0.002). Looking finally at the
variables in z, we find that the share of inhabitants over 80 years (OLD),
the share most likely to need elderly care, enters negatively, yet
insignificant, before the elderly reform in 1992, when the responsibility
for elderly care was transferred from the county level to the municipal
level, and significantly positive after the reform. Somewhat surprising is
the result that the share of inhabitants younger than 16 years of age does
not seem to affect the level of employment, nor does this variable lagged
one period. The political variable is positive, which is in line with our
prior expectation, but not significantly different from zero.
4.2 Dynamic model
In the light of earlier findings in the literature of dynamic behaviour of
local governments, we would like to examine if allowing for dynamics
could affect the results, before investigating other extensions of the
model. The dynamic specification uses equation (10) as a starting point.
In addition to an additive error term e it , we will, once again, allow for
individual, municipality-specific fixed effects, fi , and the equation to be
estimated is hence given by
( ) ( ) n z y g w n f it
d
t it it
m
it it it it it
d
i it = + + + + + - + + - i f t j t l e     1 1 (12)
where z is defined as in the previous section.20
Table 3. Model 1: Basic dynamic employment model (eq. 12).
GMM1 GMM2
Variable Coeff SE t-ratio Coeff SE t-ratio
EMPL(-1) 0.3560 0.0560 6.3559 0.2965 0.0441 6.7221
INCOME 0.1643 0.0411 3.9966 0.1625 0.0275 5.9160
PRICE -0.3981 0.0804 -4.9124 -0.3917 0.0589 -6.6543
YOUNG -0.1447 0.1407 -1.0287 -0.0841 0.1237 -0.6800
YOUNG(-1) 0.3185 0.1330 2.3949 0.2969 0.1134 2.6175
OLD _91 2.3697 1.4084 1.6825 2.3642 1.0299 2.2957
OLD 92_ 4.2866 1.4278 3.0023 4.1291 1.0450 3.9511
SOC 0.2856 0.5021 0.5688 0.4904 0.3967 1.2364
Sargan(1) Sargan(2) AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) AR(4)
Test -4.4268 -0.7573 -1.0965 -0.4720
p-value 0.000 0.391 0.000 0.224 0.136 0.318
Notes:
i) The set of instruments includes INCOME, YOUNG, YOUNG(-1) and SOC in first differences,
PRICE and OLD in levels lagged 2 and more years, EMPLOYMENT in levels lagged 3 and more
years, as well as the constant and time dummies.
ii) See further notes for Table 2.
Estimating the basic model in equation (12), we get the results given in
Table 3
15. Once again we cannot reject the model-specification in the
GMM2 column: neither the Sargan-statistic, nor the  AR(1)-AR(4) tests
reject the specification. Comparing with the static model, the p-value of
the  Sargan-statistic does improve quite a bit. This is by no means a
formal test, but nevertheless speaks in favour of the dynamic
specification (apart from the fact that lagged employment appears highly
                                                        
15 The choice of instruments has been carried out in the same manner as for the
static model.21
significant)
16. Looking at the results, we see that they are qualitatively
quite similar to those obtained previously. The main difference is that the
GMM2 estimate of OLD_91 enters significantly, which however might
well be a type I error, bearing in mind the small sample properties of the
estimator (see Monte Carlo results in e.g.  Arellano & Bond (1991) and
Bergström (1997)). Lagged employment comes in positive and highly
significant, with an estimate of l of 0.70, implying that approximately
70% of the desired change in employment is implemented in the first
year. Calculating  elasticities we see, from the column under the heading
”Model 1” in Table 8, that the short run wage-, income- and grant
elasticities are  -0.771, 0.355 and   0.014 respectively. Corresponding
figures for the long run  elasticities are -1.096, 0.504 and 0.019, estimates
that are quite similar to those obtained in the static model. Referring to
the mentioned findings in the literature and having obtained the above
results indicating significant dynamics, we choose to continue our
investigation controlling for dynamics, and hence to use equation (12) as
our preferred specification.
4.3 Further extensions
As mentioned in section 2, studies of local public economics have often
found that grants affect spending differently from own-source revenues
17.
Allowing the parameter estimate on median income to differ from the
estimate on received grants we have estimated the following ”flypaper
model”
                                                        
16 An alternative specification is a static one where the errors follow an AR(1)-
process. We have estimated a model with all regressors lagged one period, in
which both our preferred specification and the static AR(1)-model are nested.
Testing for common factors following, e.g., Sargan (1980), clearly rejects the
static model, whereas the restrictions imposed by our preferred specification is
easily accepted.
17 Often, this has been taken as evidence for the presence of a flypaper-effect.22
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The results are given in Table 4. The results are, qualitatively, quite
similar to those in Table 3. We do however find that the coefficient on
grants is significantly higher than the coefficient on median income.
Thus, our theoretical model seems to be too restrictive. Calculating the
elasticities (given in the second column of Table 8) and comparing them
with those of the previous model, we conclude that the grant elasticity is
significantly higher when allowing for different coefficients; it rises from
0.014 to 0.041. The wage (income) elasticity is somewhat lower (higher)
than in the former model, but not significantly so.23
Table 4. Model 2: Dynamic employment model allowing
for a “flypaper” effect (eq. 13)
GMM1 GMM2
Variable Coeff SE t-ratio Coeff SE t-ratio
EMPL(-1) 0.3750 0.0477 7.8691 0.2959 0.0322 9.2042
INCOME 0.1652 0.0428 3.8581 0.1890 0.0267 7.0865
GRANTS 0.5555 0.0173 3.2099 0.4926 0.0122 4.0439
PRICE -0.2660 0.0652 -4.0932 -0.2816 0.0399 -7.0511
YOUNG -0.1835 0.1206 -1.5213 -0.1425 0.0989 -1.4407
YOUNG(-1) 0.2716 0.1150 2.3623 0.1986 0.0912 2.1765
OLD _91 0.7655 0.8795 0.8703 0.8647 0.6121 1.4126
OLD 92_ 2.3933 0.8999 2.6595 2.5307 0.6388 3.9616
SOC 0.3998 0.3892 1.0274 0.4052 0.2846 1.4237
Sargan(1) Sargan(2) AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) AR(4)
Test -5.0400 -0.7833 -1.3532 -0.4686
p-value 0.000 0.328 0.000 0.217 0.089 0.320
Notes:
i) The set of instruments includes GRANTS, YOUNG, YOUNG(-1) and SOC in first differences,
PRICE, RMEDIAN and OLD in levels lagged at least 2 years, EMPLOYMENT in levels lagged at
least 3 years, as well as the constant and time dummies.
ii) See further notes for Table 2.
Given that grants influence the number of employed differently than the
median income, does it matter in what form these grants arrive? As
mentioned above, in 1993 there was a major reform that changed the
system of intergovernmental grants from specific to more general ones.24
How did this change affect the municipalities’ demand for labour? In
order to investigate this we will split the grant variable into two parts,
one before the reform (GRANT_92) and one after the reform
(GRANT93_). Looking at the results in Table 5, w e can reject the
hypothesis that grants have had the same effects on the number of people
employed in the municipalities before and after the grant reform at a 10
% significance level. From tables 5 and 8 (Model 3) we can also see that
the grant elasticity is lower in the latter time period ( 0.025 compared to
0.060 for the short run  elasticities), a period in which there has been
almost exclusively general grants. The estimates of the  elasticities are
statistically different form each other on the 10% level. This somewhat
weak support would nevertheless suggest that there appears to be a
tendency for municipalities to spend less on employing new people the
more freedom they are given in distributing received grants. In addition,
the grant elasticity for the 1993-1995 period is fairly low in economic
terms (increasing intergovernmental grants by 1 percent increases the
number employed by 0.025 percent).25
Table 5. Model 3: Dynamic employment model allowing for a “flypaper” effect
and different effects from general and specific grants.
GMM1 GMM2
Variable Coeff SE t-ratio Coeff SE t-ratio
EMPL(-1) 0.5134 0.0762 6.7393 0.4051 0.0575 7.0472
INCOME 0.1427 0.0444 3.2121 0.1690 0.0305 5.5327
GRANT_92 0.7538 0.1736 4.3412 0.6261 0.1190 5.2620
GRANT 93_ 0.3633 0.1732 2.0973 0.3297 0.1265 2.6068
PRICE -0.2557 0.0642 -3.9850 -0.2709 0.0397 -6.8155
YOUNG -0.2153 0.1241 -1.7348 -0.1594 0.1024 -1.5559
YOUNG(-1) 0.2781 0.1165 2.3877 0.2059 0.0940 2.1907
OLD _91 1.2750 0.9388 1.3581 1.2134 0.6370 1.9048
OLD 92_ 2.7453 0.9456 2.9033 2.7874 0.6570 4.2429
SOC 0.3298 0.3963 0.8322 0.3759 0.2885 1.3029
Sargan(1) Sargan(2) AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) AR(4)
Test -5.2141 -0.9201 -1.1478 -0.2231
p-value 0.000 0.227 0.000 0.179 0.126 0.412
Notes:
i) The set of instruments includes GRANT-92, GRANT 93-, YOUNG, YOUNG(-1) and SOC in
first differences, PRICE, RMEDIAN and OLD in levels lagged at least 2 years, EMPLOYMENT in
levels lagged at least 3 years, as well as the constant and time dummies.
ii) See further notes for Table 2.
The degree of sluggishness in the final model is rather severe
(l=059 . ), implying that only 59 percent of the desired change in the
level of employment is implemented in the same year. From Table 8 we
notice that the estimated short run wage elasticity is -0.53 and the long
run counterpart is -0.896. The income elasticity is 0.37 in the short run26
and 0.62 in the long run. Finally, regarding the socio-economic variables,
z , the results in the dynamic specification are very similar to those in the
static specification. However, lagged YOUNG is now significant and
positive, indicating that the municipalities are somewhat slow to adjust to
changes in the cohort consisting of young people. Furthermore, OLD is
only significant (positive) after the reform, which may seem reasonable,
since the municipalities are responsible for the care of elderly in the latter
time period but not in the former.
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
In order to test the robustness of the results above, we will now conduct
some sensitivity analysis. There have been arguments in the literature that
not all municipalities have the same behavioural patterns. It has for
example been argued that ”small” municipalities behave differently from
”large” municipalities (see, e.g.,  Holtz-Eakin & Rosen (1991) and  Borge
&  Rattsø (1993)). Furthermore, it is possible that ”socialist”
municipalities behave differently from ”conservative” ones. To
investigate these two topics, we will now divide our original sample into
four sub-samples, first according to size and then according to political
majority. We will take the model in Table 5 as our point of departure
when investigating whether municipal labour demand is different in
different types of municipalities.
Does the size of the municipality matter?
There are several ways of measuring the size of a municipality. We
assume that the relevant definition is population, and thus define small
municipalities as municipalities having a population of less than 15000
for all years 1988 to 1995 and large municipalities as municipalities
having a population of more than 20000 for the same time period. This
leaves us with 103 small and 94 large municipalities.27
The results are given in Table 6. Looking at the specification tests we
cannot reject that the models are correctly specified. From Table 8 we see
that the finding in the full sample above, i.e. that the grant elasticity was
higher with specific grants than with general ones, still holds for both
small and large municipalities. Whereas this difference is insignificant for
large municipalities, it is significant at the 5% level for small ones.
Furthermore, we find indications that the adjustment process is slower in
large municipalities (where 45% of the desired change is implemented in
the first year) than in small (where 53% of the desired change is
implemented in the first year). The estimates are, however, not
significantly different from each other. The demographic structure seems
to be more “important” (in a statistical sense) in small municipalities than
in larger ones.28
Table 6. Model 4 & 5: Dynamic employment model allowing for a “flypaper” effect
and different effects from general and specific grants.
Sample split over small and large municipalities
Small municipalities Large municipalities
GMM1 GMM2 GMM1 GMM2
Variable Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio
EMPL(-1) 0.5608 5.1102 0.4735 7.6871 0.5310 5.9879 0.5541 20.7300
RMEDIAN 0.1340 2.2187 0.1390 5.0231 0.0953 1.7783 0.0905 4.3619
GRANT_92 0.3610 1.9372 0.4648 4.6696 0.1340 0.5685 0.1987 1.7780
GRANT93_ -0.0278 -0.1921 0.1207 1.3189 0.1320 0.5870 0.1673 2.0725
PRICE -0.0918 -1.4472 -0.1390 -4.9781 -0.2390 -3.0088 -0.2140 -8.1630
YOUNG -0.3800 -1.9912 -0.2620 -2.3387 -0.7470 -0.4299 -0.3550 -0.3642
YOUNG(-1) 0.2640 1.2451 0.4794 4.3205 0.5480 0.3572 0.4009 0.4831
OLD_91 0.3800 0.0396 0.8917 1.8007 -0.2180 -0.0220 0.5473 1.4260
OLD92_ 1.2000 1.2073 1.9376 3.6735 1.2900 1.2683 1.8244 4.8457
SOC 0.1140 0.1929 -0.1760 -0.4798 -0.2200 -0.5491 -0.1210 -0.0696
Test p-value Test p-value
Sargan (1) 0.321 Sargan
(1)
0.000
Sargan (2) 0.074 Sargan
(2)
0.556
AR(1) -4.8207 0.000 AR(1) -4.5907 0.000
AR(2) -0.8815 0.189 AR(2) 0.6211 0.268
AR(3) -1.1027 0.135 AR(3) -1.6814 0.046
AR(4) 1.1764 0.120 AR(4) -0.8541 0.200
Notes
i) The set of instruments includes INCOME, YOUNG, YOUNG(-1) and SOC in first differences,
PRICE and OLD in levels lagged 2 and more years, EMPLOYMENT in levels as well lagged 3
and more years, as well as the constant and time dummies.
ii) See further notes for Table 2.29
Do political preferences matter?
Next we divide the sample into municipalities with ”socialist” preferences
and municipalities with ”conservative” preferences. We define socialist
municipalities as municipalities in which the ”left” parties (i.e. S and V)
have constituted a majority in all three elections in the studied period and
conservative municipalities as municipalities in which the ”right” parties
(i.e. C, KDS, Fp, and M) have constituted a majority in at least two of
the three elections in the studied period. In our sample, there are 92
socialist and 83 conservative municipalities.
Comparing the results in tables 7 and 8 ( elasticities), we see that the
grant elasticity is still higher before the reform than after for both
political municipality types
18. Looking at the results for socialist
municipalities, the difference between the grant elasticity before and after
the reform, is statistically significant at the 5% level. As a matter of fact,
post reform grant elasticity is not significantly different from zero for
socialist municipalities, implying that these municipalities have not used
any general grants to increase employment. We also find that the
adjustment process is significantly slower in socialist municipalities
(l=042 . ) than in conservative municipalities (l=057 . ). Noteworthy
is finally that median income is insignificant for socialist municipalities
and that both the income elasticity and the wage elasticity are
significantly lower in socialist municipalities than in conservative ones.
                                                        
18 The AR(2) test in the model for socialist municipalities indicates second order
serial correlation. The Sargan test on the other hand seems quite reassuring.30
Table 7. Model 6 & 7: Dynamic employment model (eq. 13)
Allowing for a “flypaper” effect and different effects from general and specific grants.
Sample split over conservative and socialist municipalities
Socialist municipalities Conservative municipalities
GMM1 GMM2 GMM1 GMM2
Variable Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio
EMPL(-1) 0.5813 5.6603 0.5797 18.1280 0.4329 4.7033 0.4276 12.7840
RMEDIAN 0.0324 0.4653 0.0239 1.5687 0.0968 2.3180 0.0884 6.0556
GRANT_92 0.5144 2.8745 0.4948 10.406 0.4109 1.4482 0.3498 3.6236
GRANT93_ 0.0584 0.3353 0.0439 1.0614 0.2778 1.6126 0.2349 3.6073
PRICE -0.0594 -0.7536 -0.0642 -3.4635 -0.1630 -2.4488 -0.1570 -7.7971
YOUNG 0.2282 0.9100 0.1686 1.5914 -0.4010 -1.7757 -0.3400 -3.3258
YOUNG(-1) 0.2305 0.9520 0.1588 1.6116 0.5605 2.5280 0.4659 4.7586
OLD_91 0.0890 0.1196 -0.1130 -0.4565 0.1923 0.1725 0.2127 0.0504
OLD92_ 1.7350 2.1546 1.3963 5.9622 1.9355 1.7207 1.7195 3.8876
Test p-value Test p-value
Sargan (1) 0.042 Sargan
(1)
0.000
Sargan (2) 0.405 Sargan
(2)
0.335
AR(1) -4.9344 0.000 AR(1) -4.5962 0.000
AR(2) -2.0061 0.023 AR(2) 0.4013 0.345
AR(3) 0.3906 0.348 AR(3) -0.3119 0.378
AR(4) 0.1366 0.446 AR(4) -0.4589 0.323
Notes:
i) The set of instruments includes INCOME, YOUNG, YOUNG(-1) and SOC in first differences,
PRICE and OLD in levels lagged 2 and more years, EMPLOYMENT in levels as well lagged 3
and more years, as well as the constant and time dummies.
ii) See further notes for Table 2.31
Table 8. Elasticities (standard errors)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Short run elasticities
Wage -0.771
(0.1158)
-0.554
(0.0786)
-0.533
(0.0782)
-0.422
(0.0517)
-0.273
(0.0548)
-0.126
(0.0365)
-0.309
(0.0397)
Grant 0.014
(0.0023)
0.041
(0.0102)
Grant: Pre
reform
0.060
(0.0113)
0.019
(0.0107)
0.044
(0.0095)
0.047
(0.0045)
0.033
(0.0092)
Grant: Post
reform
0.025
(0.0096)
0.013
(0.0061)
0.009
(0.0070)
0.003
(0.0031)
0.018
(0.0050)
Income 0.355
(0.0600)
0.412
(0.0582)
0.369
(0.0667)
0.198
(0.0453)
0.303
(0.0602)
0.052
(0.0333)
0.193
(0.0319)
Long run elasticities
Wage -1.096
(0.2000)
-0.787
(0.1246)
-0.896
(0.1789)
-0.946
(0.1338)
-0.518
(0.1318)
-0.300
(0.0987)
-0.540
(0.0837)
Grant 0.019
(0.0039)
0.059
(0.0154)
Grant: Pre
reform
0.100
(0.0201)
0.042
(0.0235)
0.084
(0.0195)
0.112
(0.0106)
0.058
(0.0148)
Grant: Post
reform
0.042
(0.0185)
0.029
(0.0145)
0.017
(0.0142)
0.008
(0.0075)
0.031
(0.0093)
Income 0.504
(0.1014)
0.586
(0.0918)
0.620
(0.1501)
0.443
(0.1101)
0.575
(0.1393)
0.124
(0.0803)
0.337
(0.0675)
Notes:
i)Elasticities and their standard errors have been obtained using second step estimates applying the
delta-method.
ii) Model 1 = Basic Model, Model 2 = Flypaper Model, Model 3 = Flypaper + Grant Reform Model
Model 4 = “Large” Municipalities, Model 5 = “Small” Municipalities,  Model 6 = “Socialist” Municipalities32
Model 7 = “Conservative” Municipalities
6.  Summary and Concluding Remarks
A special feature of the Scandinavian countries is the prominent role
played by the local governments. Their responsibilities cover, among
other things, the supply of private goods such as schooling, day care and
care for elderly. As a consequence, local governments in these countries
are, as measured by size, important employers. In Sweden, the local
governments constitute the largest single employer in the economy
(approximately 30% of all employed are employed by the local
governments). Despite this, studies investigating municipal labour
demand in Sweden are lacking. In an attempt to start filling the gap, we
have in this paper investigated the determinants of municipal labour
demand in Sweden during the period 1988 to 1995, a period in which the
municipalities faced new challenges in form of diminishing tax bases and
shifting demographic structures (more young and more retired people).
We assumed that the decision making process in the municipalities can be
described by a median voter model, where each median voter maximises
his or her utility function subject to both their individual budget
constraint and their municipality’s budget constraint. In addition, we
assumed that adjustment costs are prevalent in municipal labour demand
and therefore allowed for a partial adjustment process. In the empirical
specification of the theoretically derived labour demand function, we
controlled for unobserved, municipality-specific, fixed effects and macro
economic shocks that are common to all municipalities. We also
controlled for the demographic structure, motivated mainly by the
potentially idiosyncratic effects from the care-for-the-elderly reform
undertaken during the period that we study.
In this study we estimated wage-, grant-, and (median) income
elasticities, investigated what effects political factors and the
demographic structure in the municipalities have on municipal labour
demand, and examined if there were any sluggishness in the adjustment33
of municipal labour demand. We estimated with all municipalities pooled
as well as on four sub-samples: municipalities with “large” populations,
municipalities with “small” populations, “socialist” municipalities, and
“conservative” municipalities.
By utilising a major grant reform in 1993, in which a switch from mainly
specific to mainly general grants occurred, we were able to identify which
type of grants that have the largest effects on municipal employment. We
found a larger grant elasticity before the reform, which may suggest that
if the central government seeks to increase municipal employment, it
should target grants, rather than distributing them in more general forms.
We found a short run wage elasticity of approximately -0.5 and a long
run ditto of approximately -0.9. The long run elasticity is not
significantly different from one. We furthermore found a quite sluggish
adjustment process: only 60% of the desired change in municipal
employment is implemented in the first year.
From the sub-group estimations it turned out that municipalities led by a
socialist government during the entire period 1988-1995 showed a
different pattern than other municipalities. They had the lowest wage
elasticity (-0.13 in the short run), they had a low and insignificant income
elasticity, and they had the most pronounced difference in pre- and post-
reform grant  elasticities.
In this paper we have studied total municipal employment. It goes
without saying that the wage-, grant, and income  elasticities as well as
the demographic structure can have quite different effects on different
types of municipal employment. Especially, it would be interesting to
investigate the effects on the municipalities’ most important areas of
responsibility: day care, care for the elderly, and education. This is on the
top of our agenda for future research.34
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Appendix A
Description of the data set
The data-set consists of a panel of Swedish municipalities over the years
1988-1995. Out of the original 288 municipalities 38 were discarded for
the following reasons.
i) Newly created/split municipalities: 461, 488, 1535, 1814
ii) Municipalities for which missing values were observed: 127, 138, 482,
560, 604, 682, 780, 1080, 1256, 1260, 1277, 1401, 1419, 1580, 1582,
1585, 1643, 1661, 1682, 1785, 1814, 1982, 1984, 2023, 2026, 2034,
2039, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2303, 2403, 2425, 2481, 2506, 2518.
iii) Municipalities that handle tasks not normally handled by
municipalities: 980, 1280, 1480
The following variables are used in this paper either as  regressors or as
instruments:
Employment
Number of people employed by the municipality per inhabitant. The
number of employees is computed by transforming part-time employees
into a corresponding number of full-time employees.
Source: Financial statement for Swedish municipalities ( Vad  kostar
verksamheten i din kommun?)
Average: 0.0613 Std.  Dev.: 0.0086
Real Median income
Median yearly household income in the municipality deflated by CPI.
The population consists of inhabitants older than 20 years.38
Source: For the first three years Statistics Sweden ”Income and
allowances (Inkomster  och  Bidrag)” was used. Since the measure
reported therein was not comparable for the years to follow, this measure
was constructed using the LINDA database instead (See Edin &
Fredriksson (1997) for description of the LINDA-base). LINDA is not an
exhaustive sample of inhabitants, which could potentially cause problems
for the values computed for small municipalities. We have however
investigated the problem by computing real median income for 1990
using both the Statistics Sweden material and the LINDA-base, and have
not found the difference between the two values for median income
statistically significant for any municipality.
Average: 121217.2 Std.  Dev.: 13607.73
Real Average income
Average yearly household income in the municipality deflated by  CPI.
The population consists of inhabitants older than 20 years.
Source: See Real median income.
Average: 143381.9 Std.  Dev.: 19378.13
Tax-Price
Real Median income/Real Average income
Average: 0.8485039  Std.  Dev.: 0.0434025
Real Grants
Targeted and general grants received from central authorities deflated by
CPI. Expressed as  SEK per inhabitant.
Source: Yearbook for Swedish Municipalities
Average: 6603.43 Std.  Dev.: 2380.95
Income
Real Median Income + Tax-price * Real Grants39
Average: 126852.5  Std.  Dev.: 12944.82
Real Wages
Total sum of wages paid in each municipality divided by the number of
employees computed in the same way as above, deflated by  CPI.
Source: Financial statement for Swedish municipalities ( Vad  kostar
verksamheten i din kommun?)
Average: 131639.3 Std.  Dev.: 6237.96
Price
Tax-Price * Real Wages
Average: 111693  Std.  Dev.: 7750.36
Young
Share of inhabitants younger than 16 years of age.
Source: Yearbook for Swedish Municipalities
Average 0.2028   Std.  Dev.: 0.0019
Old
Share of inhabitants older than 80 years of age.
Source: Yearbook for Swedish Municipalities
Average 0.1852 Std.  Dev.: 0.0040
Soc
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 whenever a municipality is
governed by a socialist local government, i.e. S + V constituting a
majority, and zero otherwise.
Source: Yearbook for Swedish Municipalities
Average: 0.4535714  Std.  Dev.: 0.497966840
Appendix B
Covariances of key variables
Table B1 Employment
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1989    0.10639
1990  -0.082675    0.68759
1991 -0.0029818  -0.051821    0.19851
1992  -0.035028    0.74172   0.013488     1.5627
1993   0.029849   -0.15985   0.029284   -0.18043   0.11633
1994   0.012891   0.055248  0.0026704    0.12306  0.040653   0.10371
1995  -0.020621    0.10111  -0.015553    0.15938 -0.037602  0.035051    0.25098
Table B2 Income
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1989    0.26812
1990 -0.0075065    0.26572
1991   -0.44133  -0.045203   0.95879
1992   0.040721 -0.0065251  -0.10807    0.19154
1993  -0.086920  -0.039771   0.13364  -0.057297    0.16564
1994  -0.047268  -0.014423  0.058186   0.010237  -0.028917    0.14467
1995   0.050588  -0.021696 -0.074817 -0.0026630  -0.017344  -0.062389    0.1611241
Table B3 Price
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1989    0.30078
1990   -0.17323    0.34429
1991   -0.21062 -0.0072075     0.60696
1992    0.22954   -0.10709    -0.42685  0.56715
1993   -0.26112    0.11669     0.29555 -0.43827    0.70841
1994 -0.0026841   0.019661   -0.043279 0.016551  -0.070804     0.29474
1995    0.15652   -0.11203    -0.16104  0.19684   -0.24719    -0.17154   0.47106
Table B4 Grants
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1989   1.2514
1990 -0.43866    1.2502
1991  0.14178  -0.25107   0.88811
1992  0.61584   0.75737   0.41685   4.1711
1993 -0.28208   -2.0481  -0.51947  -6.0839   26.983
1994  0.15441  -0.41498   0.16563 -0.38820  -6.0896    11.664
1995 -0.42275  -0.34899 -0.083882  -2.0346   3.9616  -0.34195 3.545642
Table B5 Employment - Income
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1989  -0.040406    0.014826  0.071666 0.0052475 0.0059775  -0.0011478  0.0025630
1990    0.36697   -0.026736  -0.60699  0.076015  -0.12375   -0.070290   0.071167
1991  -0.033491    0.017537  0.051854  0.033875 0.0036319    0.017246   0.010999
1992    0.49704   0.0026731  -0.78868   0.20278  -0.17851    -0.10015    0.15312
1993   -0.11266    0.010090   0.18631  0.015171  0.036097    0.021392  -0.021120
1994   0.031079  -0.0016956 -0.051041  0.033220 -0.015818 -0.0007744   0.018593
1995   0.098784   0.0067075  -0.17867  0.025540 -0.026914   -0.014906   0.017129
Table B6 Employment - Price
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1989 -0.091305  0.043862  0.042511  -0.045190  0.042672 -0.0057589  -0.035513
1990   0.33872  -0.28094  -0.31260    0.39372  -0.46735  -0.021780    0.24695
1991 -0.031003  0.038427 -0.025940 -0.0067697  0.045936 -0.0086460  -0.020164
1992   0.36357  -0.23540  -0.45858    0.44639  -0.62175  -0.055765    0.31321
1993  -0.10241  0.059543   0.11013   -0.11915   0.16153  -0.012861  -0.086308
1994  0.020210 -0.017991 -0.024515   0.020123 -0.012507  -0.024550 -0.0037688
1995  0.086195 -0.025924  -0.12064    0.10100  -0.13600   0.019923   0.015677